The United States and Saudi Arabia have signed a landmark agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. The deal could unlock a market worth tens of billions of dollars for US reactor suppliers. However, the most politically sensitive issue is not who will build the reactors, but who will control the uranium used to fuel them.
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed an intergovernmental agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as a separate bilateral safeguards agreement.
The US Department of Energy describes the agreements as the legal foundation for a multi-decade partnership worth several billion dollars. The framework is intended to give American companies access to Saudi Arabia’s planned nuclear energy programme while strengthening the US position in the international civil nuclear market.
Saudi Arabia says the cooperation will include the exchange of technology, knowledge and expertise and will be conducted according to high international standards for nuclear safety, physical security and non-proliferation.
The kingdom wants to use nuclear power to diversify its electricity generation, reduce domestic consumption of oil and gas and eventually provide energy for seawater desalination.
Agreement could determine who builds the reactors
The cooperation framework is known as a Section 123 agreement, named after Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Such an agreement is required before American companies can export significant nuclear equipment, nuclear materials or reactor components to another country.
The deal could therefore pave the way for US-designed reactors in Saudi Arabia. According to Reuters, the plans may include Westinghouse AP1000 reactors and could involve investments worth tens of billions of dollars over a period of approximately 30 years.
No final reactor construction decision has yet been taken. A feasibility study is expected to assess how American technology could be deployed in the kingdom.
For Washington, the agreement is also a geopolitical initiative. Saudi Arabia has discussed nuclear cooperation with China, Russia, France and South Korea over several years.
Through the new framework, the United States is seeking to prevent Chinese or Russian companies from gaining a dominant role in one of the Middle East’s largest prospective energy projects.
The US Department of Energy says the partnership will support American industry and supply chains while expanding US strategic influence. The administration views nuclear technology exports as a tool for economic growth and as a means of maintaining American influence over international safety and non-proliferation standards.
Uranium enrichment remains the central dispute
The most controversial issue is Saudi Arabia’s ambition to develop its own nuclear fuel cycle.
Uranium used in most commercial nuclear reactors is normally enriched so that the concentration of the fissile isotope uranium-235 is increased to around five per cent.
However, the same technology can be used to enrich uranium to much higher levels. Uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel are therefore regarded as particularly sensitive from a nuclear non-proliferation perspective.
The full text of the agreement had not been published when the deal was announced.
Reuters reported that the framework could provide Saudi Arabia with a possible route to domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing without requiring the kingdom to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol.
The Additional Protocol gives the IAEA broader access to information and greater powers to inspect locations that have not previously been declared as nuclear facilities.
According to the US government, the bilateral safeguards agreement will introduce additional monitoring of facilities covered by American-Saudi cooperation.
The Arms Control Association has nevertheless noted that these controls appear to be limited to the projects covered by the bilateral framework. The IAEA Additional Protocol would apply more broadly to Saudi Arabia’s entire nuclear programme.
The situation became more complicated when US President Donald Trump later stated that the agreement would not permit Saudi uranium enrichment.
He also said implementation would depend on Saudi Arabia normalising relations with Israel and joining the Abraham Accords. This condition was not mentioned in the original statements issued by the US Department of Energy or the Saudi government.
There is therefore considerable uncertainty over the agreement’s actual conditions.
The difference between a complete ban on domestic enrichment and a system under which enrichment could be permitted under special safeguards will be decisive when the agreement is assessed by the US Congress and nuclear non-proliferation experts.
Congress will review the agreement
The agreement will now be submitted to the US Congress for review. Lawmakers will have 90 days of continuous session to consider the framework.
To block the agreement, both the House of Representatives and the Senate would have to approve a resolution of disapproval. A presidential veto could only be overridden by a two-thirds majority in both chambers.
Critics argue that Saudi Arabia should accept the same so-called gold standard included in the United Arab Emirates’ nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in 2009.
Under that agreement, the UAE formally renounced domestic uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing and agreed to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol.
Supporters of the Saudi agreement argue that US involvement would provide greater transparency and stronger safety requirements than a programme based on Chinese or Russian technology.
For Saudi Arabia, nuclear power could eventually release more oil and gas for export while providing stable electricity for industry, cities and desalination plants.
For the United States, reactor exports, industrial jobs and strategic influence are at stake.
Before the first reactor can be built, however, the most politically sensitive question must be resolved: whether Saudi Arabia will be limited to imported nuclear fuel or allowed to master technologies that could bring it closer to a complete domestic nuclear fuel cycle.
Facts: The US-Saudi nuclear agreement
Agreement: US Section 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreement
Signed: July 22, 2026
Parties: United States and Saudi Arabia
Possible duration: Approximately 30 years
Potential technology: Including Westinghouse AP1000 reactors
Purpose: Electricity generation, energy diversification and possible desalination
Status: Subject to review by the US Congress
Unresolved issue: Conditions for uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel management
Sources: US Department of Energy, Saudi Press Agency, World Nuclear News, Reuters, Associated Press and the Arms Control Association.
